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Many decisions we make require visually identifying and evaluating
numerous alternatives quickly. These usually vary in reward, or
value, and in low-level visual properties, such as saliency. Both
saliency and value inﬂuence the ﬁnal decision. In particular, saliency
affects ﬁxation locations and durations, which are predictive of
choices. However, it is unknown how saliency propagates to the
ﬁnal decision. Moreover, the relative inﬂuence of saliency and value
is unclear. Here we address these questions with an integrated
model that combines a perceptual decision process about where
and when to look with an economic decision process about what
to choose. The perceptual decision process is modeled as a drift–
diffusion model (DDM) process for each alternative. Using psycho-
physical data from a multiple-alternative, forced-choice task, in
which subjects have to pick one food item from a crowded display
via eye movements, we test four models where each DDM process
is driven by (i) saliency or (ii) value alone or (iii) an additive or (iv)
a multiplicative combination of both. We ﬁnd that models includ-
ing both saliency and value weighted in a one-third to two-thirds
ratio (saliency-to-value) signiﬁcantly outperform models based on
either quantity alone. These eye ﬁxation patterns modulate an eco-
nomic decision process, also described as a DDM process driven by
value. Our combined model quantitatively explains ﬁxation patterns
and choices with similar or better accuracy than previous models,
suggesting that visual saliency has a smaller, but signiﬁcant, inﬂu-
ence than value and that saliency affects choices indirectly through
perceptual decisions that modulate economic decisions.
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One important goal of neuroscience and economics is to un-derstand the computational mechanisms that underlie de-
cision making between multiple alternatives. Interestingly, this
goal has proceeded along two seemingly parallel paths that con-
sider either perceptual decision making, namely decisions about
perceptual properties of alternatives, or economic decision mak-
ing, which considers the value of alternatives (1). Although these
types of decisions can be constructed to be mutually exclusive in
the laboratory, in more natural contexts, decisions nearly always
involve perceptual decisions about how to sample information
and value-based decisions about which alternatives are more valu-
able. Importantly, however, very little attention has been paid to
how perceptual and economic decision processes may interact.
One recent paper reported a visual saliency bias where, indepen-
dent of consumer preferences, visually salient options are more
likely to be chosen than less salient alternatives. It is not clear,
however, which mechanism gives rise to this effect or how per-
ceptual processes interact with economic choices (2).
Choices and reaction times during perceptual decision making
have been accurately modeled by stochastic accumulator models
such as the drift–diffusion model (DDM) (3), the race model (4),
and the leaky competing accumulator model (LCA) (5). Such
accumulator models also quantitatively model economic choices
in a wide array of tasks (6–9).
These models assume that noisy evidence is accumulated over
time and that decisions are made by comparing the evidence
between each alternative. When the relative evidence for one
option exceeds a threshold, that option is chosen. In perceptual
decision-making tasks, the noise typically comes from the stimulus
itself, e.g., in moving-dot experiments where the noise is set by the
dots’ movement coherence (cf. ref. 10). In economic decision-
maki2ng tasks, the noise can come from several sources including
shifts in attention between alternatives or sampling (11, 12).
Eye movements are considered a good measure of overt at-
tention (13, 14) and recent work has used eye movements as a
measure of the shifts in attention that inﬂuence economic deci-
sions. This model [the attentional DDM (aDDM)] has been
shown to accurately model choices and mean reaction times in
two- and three-alternative economic decisions (6, 8, 9). This model
clearly shows how ﬁxation durations and ﬁxation sequences affect
choices. However, in these studies, ﬁxations were always measured
empirically and then used as input to their model, thus “taking the
ﬁxation process as exogenously given” (ref. 9, p. 2).
Meanwhile, decades of research in visual neuroscience have
yielded numerous models of the ﬁxation process in many different
tasks, including free viewing (cf. ref. 15), reading (cf. ref. 16), and
visual search (cf. ref. 17). In economic decision tasks between si-
multaneously presented alternatives, the task resembles a multi-
ple-target visual search. Eye movements during visual search are
generally assumed to be the result of a winner-take-all process
operating on an underlying saliency map (17–21). The saliency
map can include exogenous, physical conspicuity (“bottom–up”
saliency) and/or intrinsic or behavioral relevance (“top–down”
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ing patterns and choices.
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information) (21). By assuming that the observer’s gaze tran-
sitions between regions of high saliency, these models accurately
predict ﬁxation locations with up to 90% accuracy (22, 23).
Accumulator models also account for saccade target selection
and time to saccade (or reaction time) in taskswheremonkeysmake
single saccades from a central ﬁxation point to a chosen stimulus
(24, 25). Such models are particularly attractive for this task be-
cause, in addition to quantitatively explaining the psychometrics
and reaction times during perceptual choice, they have a neurally
plausible implementation. Speciﬁcally, visually responsive neurons
in the frontal eye ﬁelds (FEFs) change their ﬁring rates in response
to both bottom–up saliency and top–down goals (26–31). These
neurons drive the ﬁring rates of the FEFs and superior colliculus
(SC) movement neurons, which behave like stochastic integrators
by increasing theirﬁring rates to aﬁxed threshold and then initiating
a saccade via the oculomotor brainstem nuclei (24, 32–36). How-
ever, most of these studies consider only one decision per trial (e.g.,
the ﬁrst saccade) and allow the decision process to reset between
trials. Although this type of task allows clean modeling of target
selection and reaction times, it does not necessarily generalize to
tasks where subjects are allowed to overtly search a display
through multiple, sequential eye movements.
One recent paradigm for studying decisions during multiple-
target search involves subjects searching an array of food items
for an item they would like to eat (cf. ref. 8). These decisions
involve a combination of perceptual decision making about where
to move the eyes and economic decision making about which al-
ternative to choose. We present a model assuming two parallel
processes are involved in visual search for a liked item. One
process evaluates an item’s value as it is being viewed whereas
the other process determines where the eyes will go next. The
former we expect is inﬂuenced explicitly by value and implicitly
by saliency. The latter we expect is explicitly inﬂuenced by both
saliency and value (cf. refs. 37 and 38). The model is tested with
eye-tracking and psychophysical data from subjects performing
a search task for a liked food item.
Our combined model of perceptual and economic decision
making, validated with an eye-tracking experiment, addresses the
following questions. First, to what extent can stochastic accu-
mulator models account for the ﬁxation locations, durations, and
sequences in an economic visual search task? Second, to what
extent do bottom–up saliency and top–down value inﬂuence
choices? And, third, can parallel perceptual and economic de-
cision-making processes account for ﬁxations and choices during
behaviorally relevant decision making?
Computational Model
Ultimately, we want to model the probability that subjects will
choose a particular item n, which we denote pðnÞ. We decom-
posed this problem into two simpler pieces, using the law of total
probability (Eq. 1). This allows us to model the probability that
a subject’s gaze will follow a certain trajectory, pðtkÞ, and the
conditional probability that a subject chose item n given that his/
her gaze followed a certain trajectory, pðnjtkÞ, separately. We call
the model of pðtkÞ the “gaze model” and the model of pðnjtkÞ the
“conditional choice model”:
pðnÞ ¼
X
k
pðnjtkÞ pðtkÞ: [1]
The Gaze Model of pðtkÞ. To model the gaze trajectory, tk, we as-
sume that each ﬁxation location is the outcome of a decision
about the next ﬁxation location. We model this decision process
using the DDM, assuming that each ﬁxation location has a DDM
unit driven by a weighted combination of saliency and value. By
solving for the ﬁrst passage times, we calculate the probability
that gaze will transition from one ﬁxation location to another,
pj;i, and the probability of the transition time, fj;iðtÞ.
The DDM. The drift–diffusion model has been widely used to
model decision making (3, 10, 39–41) and saccadic target se-
lection in single-saccade paradigms (24, 25). It can be formulated
as shown in Eq. 2, where xj is the variable that is accumulating,
aj is the drift of the jth accumulator, t is time, c is the SD of zero-
mean Gaussian-distributed noise, and dW is a Wiener process:
dxj ¼ ajdtþ cdW : [2]
Here, the drift is either the sum or the product of saliency and
value with normalized weights ks and kv, respectively:
aj ¼ kssj þ kvvj or aj ¼

kssj

×

kvvj

: [3]
In the single alternative DDM, noisy evidence accumulates
to a speciﬁc threshold, θ, whereupon a decision is made. When
there are multiple alternatives and one accumulator for each
alternative, the ﬁrst accumulator to reach the threshold indicates
a decision toward that accumulator’s alternative. Using sto-
chastic integration methods to solve for the probability dis-
tribution of ﬁrst passage times of each accumulator, fjðtÞ, one
can obtain the following closed-form solution (Eq. 4), which
follows an inverse Gaussian distribution (42, 43). Fig. 1C shows
that this is a right-skewed distribution that is valid only on the
positive-real axis:
Fig. 1. (A) Task. Subjects ﬁxated on the ﬁxation cross, viewed the display
image, and then looked at the gray region coincident with their chosen item
and pressed the spacebar. (B) Calculation of saliency and value ranks. Saliency
map for display image was obtained with EyeQuant Attention Analytics
software, which includes standard channels such as color, intensity, and
orientation, as well as shapes. To obtain ranks, pixel values are summed in
the region corresponding to each object and ranked (4 = highest, 1 =
lowest). Value ranks are obtained by looking up the liking rating for each
item shown (4 = highest, 1 = lowest). (C ) Calculation of pj,i . (Top) fjðtÞ, the
probability that each item’s DDM unit (Inset) reaches a threshold for an
arbitrary ﬁxation in the sequence. Drifts shown in Inset are calculated from
saliency and value ranks shown in B according the equation aj ¼ 2sj þ 3vj .
Solid blue line indicates fjðtÞ of the example unit of interest. (Middle) FiðtÞ
with the same color code as in Top. There is no blue FjðtÞ because this is the
item of interest.∏h≠jFhðtÞ is shown as a thick black line. (Bottom) fj,iðtÞ (from
Eq. 6), i.e., the probability of transitioning from the currently ﬁxated item, i,
to item j. The currently ﬁxated item could be any item except the blue item.
Shaded region corresponds to Eq. 7 result for the blue unit. There is only
a small probability that the blue unit will cross the threshold ﬁrst, with this
event occurring near 190 ms.
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fjðtÞ ¼ θﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2πc2t3
p e−
ðθ− aj tÞ2
2c2 t : [4]
To determine the probability that each accumulator j will
reach the threshold ﬁrst as a function of time, we multiply the
probability density function for the jth accumulator, fjðtÞ, by the
survival function, FhðtÞ, for all other accumulators as shown in
Eq. 6. Fig. 1C shows this operation for an example case of four
alternatives:
FhðtÞ ¼
Z∞
t
fhðsÞds: [5]
fj;iðtÞ ¼ fjðtÞ∏
h≠j
FhðtÞ: [6]
By integrating Eq. 6 over all positive time, we obtain the prob-
ability that the jth acculumator is the ﬁrst to cross the threshold. In
our formulation, this is equivalent to the probability that the gaze
transitions from the current location i to location j, namely, the
transition probability pj;i :
pj;i ¼
Z∞
0
fj;iðtÞdt: [7]
Accounting for cortical processing and movement planning/execution
delays. Eq. 6 describes the probability of making the decision as
a function of time. Importantly, because we are measuring the
decision in terms of eye movements, the dwell time that we measure
includes not only the time required to make the decision, but
also the time to extract the object features and the time required
to plan and execute an eye movement. As discussed in the in-
troduction, there is a large body of evidence suggesting that the
decision process about where to look next occurs in the FEF (24,
26–36).
On the basis of data from neurophysiological measurements in
awake monkeys, we can assume that the delay between the retina
and the FEF is normally distributed at 75 ± 10 ms (44). Similarly,
in awake monkeys, studies have shown that the delay between
FEF threshold crossings and eye movements is normally distrib-
uted at 30 ± 10 ms (45). To include these delays in our model, we
simply convolve the result of Eq. 6 with a normal distribution
centered at 75 ms and a normal distribution centered at 30 ms,
both with a SD of 10 ms. Because these distributions are probability
density distributions and thus integrate to one, the magnitude of
the distribution should not change as a result of this convolution:
f j;iðtÞ ¼ N ð75; 10Þ p fj;iðtÞ pNð30; 10Þ: [8]
Importantly, another candidate region for the decision process
about where to look next is the lateral interparietal cortex (LIP)
(cf. ref. 10). However, the latency to LIP is normally distributed
at 90 ± 10 ms (44) and so the discrepancy should be only 15 ms
(or 7% of a typical ﬁxation duration). Changing the latency to
cortex by 15 ms does not change the results of this study in
any way.
Use the Markov property to determine pðtkÞ. Eq. 7 is the probability of
transitioning from location i to location j. To determine the
probability of visiting a certain sequence of L locations ℓk, i.e.,
following trajectory tk, we assume the Markov property. In this
context, this means that the probability of ﬁxating on an item
does not depend on any past history of ﬁxations, including whether
or not one is currently ﬁxated on a certain item. We can therefore
multiply the probabilities of making each transition together as in
Eq. 10. We show that the Markov property is a good assumption
for our data in Results:
ℓk ¼ ½l1; l2; l3; . . . ; lL [9]
pðtkÞ ¼ ∏
L
m¼2
plm;lm− 1 : [10]
Importantly, because subjects make relatively few transitions
during each trial, we assume that each transition is similar and
thus we treat the initial ﬁxations (i.e., the transition away from
the ﬁxation cross-location made by the ﬁrst saccade) the same as
later ﬁxations. Furthermore, as we show in Results, subjects often
make reﬁxations onto the same items and so we have allowed
reﬁxations in the model. This means that fi;iðtÞ is the probability
of making a transition from the current item onto the current
item as a function of time or of remaining at the same location.
In practice, subjects typically ﬁxate on a different part of the
packaging when reﬁxating on the same item. Future versions of
the model could easily take this into account by increasing the
granularity over which saliency is calculated.
The Conditional Choice Model of pðnjtkÞ.Using the equations above,
we can calculate the probability of every possible gaze trajectory,
including its associated temporal structure. To calculate pðnÞ we
also need to determine the probability of choosing each item in
a display based on this gaze trajectory, pðnjtkÞ. To do this, we use
a modiﬁed version of the model proposed in ref. 8. The basic
idea behind this model is that the longer you spend looking at an
item that you like, the more likely you are to choose that item.
Mathematically, this is modeled as a DDM, where the drift is
proportional to the value of the item and scaled by whether or
not you are looking at it. In contrast to the gaze model, the
conditional choice model operates on the difference between the
accumulators rather than on the absolute value of the accumu-
lators. The difference between accumulators is deﬁned as a “max-
vs.-next” operation where the absolute value of the next-highest
accumulator is subtracted from the absolute value of a particular
accumulator. More concretely, the model follows the following
equations.
The drift associated with each item j ðbjÞ is deﬁned as the value
of the item j ðvjÞmultiplied by a scale factor (w) that is less than 1
when the item is not being looked at:
bj ¼

vj; gaze at j
w vj; gaze not at j
; 0<w< 1:
A drift–diffusion process then describes how each item accu-
mulates “information” subject to the same equation we used for
the gaze model, Eq. 2,
dyj ¼ bjdtþ cdW ; [11]
where w ¼ 0:3 and c ¼ 0:014 (6, 8, 9). Importantly, the models
described in the Krajbich and Rangel papers (6, 8, 9) all assume
that the noise (or spread of the drift) at each time step is constant.
This assumption causes their model to differ from the standard
drift–diffusion model, where the noise is a function of time (46).
Ultimately, a model with a constant noise term will predict a
Gaussian and much narrower reaction time distribution, whereas
a model with a time-dependent noise term will predict an inverse
Gaussian, a much broader and more skewed reaction time dis-
tribution. Because reaction times are commonly known to have a
right-skewed distribution (Fig. 2), we use the standard drift–diffusion
model with a time-dependent noise term ðcdW Þ.
Notably, because this is a standard DDM process, the value of
yj at each point in time can be described by the Gaussian in Eq.
12 as shown in Fig. S1:
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p

yjjt
 ¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2πc2t
p e−
ðyj − bj tÞ2
2ct ¼ N bjt; ct: [12]
Because this is a max-vs.-next process, the random variable of
interest is actually the accumulation for each item ðyjÞ minus the
maximum of the rest of the accumulators at every point in time
as shown below. Because these are all Gaussians, the difference
is easily computed without need of convolution:
YjðtÞ ¼ yjðtÞ−maxðyhðtÞÞ; where h ≠ j: [13]
Accordingly, the value of YjðtÞ will be increasing only when the
accumulator for item j has accumulated more than any other pro-
cess (Fig. S2). Then the decision problem becomes ﬁnding the
probability that each YjðtÞ is the ﬁrst to reach a threshold of +1.
Calculating the probability of choosing each item. To calculate the
probability of choosing each item, we consider each possible ﬁxa-
tion sequence separately. Using the observed range of ﬁxations to
set the range, we considered ﬁxation sequences involving two to six
ﬁxations, resulting in 5,456 possible trajectories. For each ﬁxation
sequence, we calculate the probability of each relative decision
process (from Eq. 13) crossing the threshold of +1. We compute
this by integrating the temporal probability distribution described
by Eq. 13, evaluated at+1 across all t. This results in the probability
that an item n is chosen given a particular trajectory tk, or pðnjtkÞ.
After calculating this for every tk, by Eq. 1, we compute the total
probability of choosing item n by multiplying by the pðtkÞ.
Results
Nineteen California Institute of Technology (Caltech) undergradu-
ate students completed an experiment where they were asked to
view a 2 × 2 grid of snack food items for 2 s and indicate which
item they would like to eat most at the end of the experiment. At
the end of the experiment a random trial was chosen and subjects
were asked to eat the item they chose on that trial. During the
decision process, subjects’ eye movements were measured and
used to record their choices. On the basis of subjective prefer-
ence ratings and quantitative measurement of visual salience,
each item could be described in terms of its rank salience and
value to the subject. The measured eye movements and rank sa-
lience and values form the basis for validating and testing the
computational model described above.
Basis of the Model. Fixation durations predict choices. The standard
drift–diffusion model described above predicts that the ﬁxation
durations will follow an inverse Gaussian distribution. Consistent
with previous studies (47), we found that the distribution of all
ﬁxation durations followed a right-skewed distribution with
a median of 214 ms and a median average deviation (MAD) of
±82 ms (Fig. 2A). We use the median to describe this distribu-
tion because it is nonnormal. On a per subject basis, this distri-
bution was not signiﬁcantly different from an inverse Gaussian
distribution for all subjects, after removing anticipatory saccades
that resulted in ﬁxation durations less than 80 ms (P> 0:01,
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test). This demonstrates that the standard
DDM is a good choice to model these data.
During the 2-s viewing time subjects made a median of 5 ± 1.2
ﬁxations, ranging between 2 and 10 ﬁxations. There were dif-
ferences between subjects, with individual subjects ranging from
3 ± 1.1 ﬁxations up to 7 ± 1.3 ﬁxations per trial (median ±
MAD). Because the display contained only four different items,
subjects often reﬁxated on items that had already been ﬁxated on
in the trial. Fig. 2B shows the distribution of the total ﬁxation
time on each item (the sum of all ﬁxation durations on the item),
which also follows a right-skewed distribution with a median of
390 ± 215 ms.
Using this total ﬁxation duration, we conﬁrmed previous ﬁnd-
ings (6, 8) that the probability of choosing a particular item in-
creases the longer an item is ﬁxated on (Fig. 2B). The increase is
approximately linear, beginning with a zero chance of choosing
an item and crossing the chance level between 300 ms and 400 ms.
These data are consistent with the predictions of many choice
process models, including the aDDM (6–8).
Testing the Markov assumption. To test whether the Markov prop-
erty holds, we calculated the probability of ﬁxating on item ℓm
given that the previous ﬁxation was on location ℓm−1 and com-
pared it to the probability of ﬁxating on item ℓm given that the
previous two ﬁxations had been on items ℓm−1 and ℓm−2. For the
Markov property to hold, these probabilities should be equal.
Indeed, we found no statistical difference between the two dis-
tributions pðℓmjℓm−1Þ and pðℓmjℓm−1; ℓm−2Þ either on an individual
subject basis (P> 0:052, χ2 -test) or with all subjects pooled
(P ¼ 0:076, χ2 -test). Thus, the Markov property holds in this
dataset and is a reasonable assumption.
Validation of the Gaze Model. Parameter ﬁts. The parameter ﬁts
were performed as discussed in Materials and Methods. Table 1
shows the ﬁtted values and the ﬁt statistics (nχ
2, nAIC, and nAUC)
averaged across all 19 subjects and all seed points. Brieﬂy, nχ
2 is
the Pearson χ2 -statistic between observed and predicted tran-
sition times, nAIC is the Akaike information criterion, and nAUC
is the area under the receiver–operator characteristic (ROC) curve.
The n before each statistic indicates that they were normalized by
Fig. 2. Probability of choosing an item as a function of the time spent
looking at it. (A) Individual ﬁxation durations. (Upper) Histogram of ﬁxation
durations including all subjects and trials. Shaded line shows ﬁtted inverse
Gaussian probability density function. Last bar on right includes all ﬁxations
longer than 600 ms. (Lower) Mean ± SEM probability that the item ﬁxated
on for a speciﬁc duration was ultimately chosen. We use the mean here
because probabilities were not signiﬁcantly different from normal [P > 0:01,
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test; 30-ms bins (both Upper and Lower)]. Increase in
variance toward 600 ms is due to the low number of samples in this region
(Upper). (B) Total dwell time. (Upper) Histogram of total dwell times across
all subjects and trials. This distribution had a very long tail (out to 2 s) and
the last bar on the right includes all dwell times greater than or equal to
1,000 ms. (Lower) Mean ± SEM probability that the item ﬁxated on for
a speciﬁc dwell time was ultimately chosen [50-ms bins (both Upper and
Lower)]. Chance is 1/4.
Table 1. Gaze model parameter ﬁts
Parameter
or Metric
Model
s only v only s + v s × v
θ 672 ± 19 630 ± 17 623 ± 12 661 ± 16
c 27 ± 2.4 28 ± 2.0 43 ± 1.4 51 ± 1.5
ks 3.30 ± 0.15 0 0.42 ± 0.08 1.95 ± 0.16
kv 0 3.21 ± 0.15 1.45 ± 0.10 2.89 ± 0.17
P of nχ
2 0.33 ± 0.22 0.61 ± 0.14 0. 77 ± 0.24 0.87 ± 0.21
nχ
2 141 ± 21 129 ± 21 122 ± 17 116 ± 14
nAIC 560 ± 65 483 ± 55 258 ± 23 198 ± 6
nAUC 0.63 ± 0.06 0.70 ± 0.06 0.89 ± 0.04 0.93 ± 0.02
Values reported are the mean across subjects ± the SEM.
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the number of valid saliency–value combinations for each subject
seeMaterials and Methods for details. Models that have an nAUC
closer to 1 and smaller nχ
2 and nAIC statistics provide a better ﬁt
to the data.
Table 1 shows four main results. First, the model containing
only value information outperforms the model containing only
saliency information. Second, the models containing both sa-
liency information and value information provide a better ﬁt to
the data than do the models containing only one or the other,
even when evaluated with the nAIC, which accounts for the in-
crease from three to four parameters. Third, the multiplicative
model outperforms the additive model. And, ﬁnally, for the
combined saliency and value models, saliency has roughly one-
third to two-thirds the inﬂuence of value.
However, the nχ
2 and nAIC ﬁt statistics vary approximately
±10% based on which subject was left out of our leave-one-out
analysis, making it difﬁcult to establish the difference in ﬁt sta-
tistics between the models. Thus, we also looked at the ﬁt statistics
for each subject that was left out. Fig. 3 shows the percentage of
difference in the nAIC between the multiplicative model and the
three other models. A positive percentage difference indicates
that the multiplicative model had a smaller nAIC than the in-
dicated model (and vice versa), and thus ﬁtted the data better
(per degree of freedom).
Fig. 3 shows that for 9 of the 19 subjects, all of the trends from
Table 1 remain valid. If we look at each trend on the basis of
which subject was left out, we ﬁnd the following. First, in 14 of
the 19 subjects (74%), the value-only model outperforms the
saliency-only model. Second, the combined models outperform
the saliency-only and value-only models in 15 subjects (79%).
And, ﬁnally, for 15 subjects (79%), the multiplicative model out-
performs all of the other models. Fig. 3 also shows that the ratio of
ks to kv was robust across subjects, maintaining a ratio near 13 for
11 of the 19 subjects (58%) for the additive model and a ratio near
2
3 for 16 of the 19 subjects (84%) for the multiplicative model (all
veriﬁed at P> 0:05, Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test).
Saliency and value are both correlated with the ﬁxation duration. In
addition to predicting the overall ﬁxation sequence with high
accuracy (Table 1), the gaze model also predicts how the ﬁxation
durations change with increasing value and saliency. From the
model equations, it is clear that transitions to highly liked and
highly salient items will occur quickly because they will have large
drift terms. However, once centered at a highly liked and highly
salient location, transitions away from this location will take longer
because the magnitude of the drift will be lower. Thus, the model
predicts that ﬁxations on highly liked and highly salient items
will last longer than ﬁxations on other items. Further, because
kv is 1.5–3 times greater than ks, the model also predicts that
the ﬁxation durations will increase more rapidly as a function
of value than as a function of saliency.
Fig. 4A shows the actual ﬁxation durations as a function of
value with the modeled ﬁxation durations superimposed. As ex-
pected, the model containing only saliency information does not
show any difference in the ﬁxation durations as a function of
value (P > 0.05, Kruskal–Wallis test). Models containing value
information (v only, sþ v, and s× v), however, show an increase
in the ﬁxation durations for items with value rankings of 3 or 4
(P < 0.001, Kruskal–Wallis test). Moreover, the multiplicative
model ﬁtted the data best, with a P value of 0.71, followed by
the additive model (P = 0.67), the value-only model (P = 0.57),
and the salience model (P = 0.04, P values of the χ2 –goodness-
of-ﬁt test).
Similarly, Fig. 4B shows that the value-only model does not
account for the increase in ﬁxation duration as a function of
saliency rank (P > 0.05, Kruskal–Wallis test), whereas the com-
bined models follow this increase (P < 0.01, Kruskal–Wallis test).
The additive model ﬁtted the data best, with a P value of 0.91,
followed by the value-only model (P = 0.85), the salience-only
model (P= 0.60), and the multiplicative model (P= 0.53, P values
of the χ2 –goodness-of-ﬁt test). Interestingly, the multiplicative
model and the saliency-only model overpredict the inﬂuence of
saliency, showing a steeper slope than in the data. The results
from Fig. 4 A and B are also consistent when broken down by all
combinations of saliency and value, as shown in Figs. S3 and S4.
In summary, the multiplicative model ﬁts the data better when
grouped by value, but the additive model ﬁts better when grou-
ped by saliency. Thus, we can see that both saliency information
and value information are required to predict the ﬁxation dura-
tions, although we cannot deﬁnitively distinguish between an ad-
ditive and a multiplicative combination.
Finally, to illustrate the model ﬁts, we also simulated two scan
paths from one subject, using the multiplicative model for a ran-
domly chosen image. Fig. 4 C and D shows the actual scan paths
and the simulated scan paths for each image. In addition to the
quantitative ﬁts above, there is a clear qualitative match between
the two.
From the ﬁt statistics and comparison of predicted and actual
ﬁxation durations we can see that the multiplicative model tends
to perform better than the additive model, although there are
exceptions. In Table 1, the nAIC metric is lower for the multi-
plicative model, but the other two ﬁt statistics (nχ
2 and nAUC)
show that the models may have similar accuracy. Thus, on the
basis of predicting ﬁxations alone, it would be difﬁcult to claim
that one outperformed the other. However, it is possible that one
of these models will provide a better account of choices. We
investigate this next.
Modeling Choices. The conditional choice model presented in
Materials and Methods is very similar to previously published
models showing that by using the actual ﬁxation patterns mea-
sured from subjects, a max-vs.-next accumulation model can ac-
curately predict choices (6, 8, 9). This model has been extensively
studied in the literature and here we sought to merely demon-
strate that our model of ﬁxation patterns can be used as input to
this conditional choice model to achieve similar accuracy.
Using the parameters for the gaze model ðθ; c; ks; kvÞ and the
parameters reported in ref. 8, we calculated the probability of
choosing each item, pðnÞ, as a function of the item’s value and
saliency for all 576 possible combinations of value and saliency.
Fig. 5 shows the actual probability of choosing an item on the
basis of its saliency and value rank as well as the simulated
probabilities. Similar to the results for ﬁxation durations, we
found that the saliency-only model was uninformative about
choice probabilities relative to values and vice versa (P > 0.05,
Kruskal–Wallis test). Furthermore, we found that the multipli-
cative model tended to overemphasize saliency information com-
pared with value information. This is consistent with the ﬁtted
Fig. 3. Fit comparison between subjects left out. (Top) Percentage of nAIC
difference between the multiplicative model and the three other models.
Ratio of ks to kv for the additive model (Middle) and the multiplicative
model (Bottom) is shown. Horizontal lines indicate the ratio reported in
Table 1. Values plotted are mean ± SEM across subjects and parameter ﬁt-
ting seeds (Materials and Methods).
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values of ks and kv for the gaze model, which show that the
additive model weights saliency and value in a 1-to-3 ratio and
the multiplicative model weights saliency and value in a 2-to-
3 ratio.
Thus, given that the additive and multiplicative models have
similar accuracy for predicting gaze, we conclude that the addi-
tive model is a better predictor of choices from gaze.
Discussion
We have shown that two independent stochastic accumulator
models, one that models the gaze trajectory and one that models
the valuation process, can account not only for the pattern of
ﬁxations across a display but also for the subsequent choices.
Furthermore, we have demonstrated that bottom–up visual sa-
liency inﬂuences choices and that it affects the decision process
by biasing the location and duration of ﬁxations, but not the val-
uation process directly. We found that visual ﬁxations are driven
by a combination of saliency and value information, likely in a 1-to-3
additive combination or 2-to-3 multiplicative combination. This
model brings together modeling approaches from visual neuro-
science, decision making, and neuroeconomics to provide a unique
perspective on how visually based appetitive decisions are made
and inﬂuenced by the properties of visual displays.
The Relative Effect of Saliency and Value. We found that saliency
ðksÞ, or bottom–up information, has less of a contribution than
value ðkvÞ, or top–down information, with a ratio of ∼1-to-3 or
2-to-3 (saliency to value). At least one previous study also in-
vestigated the relative effects of saliency and value in a similar
task, and, contrary to our ﬁndings, reported a ratio of 2:1 (sa-
liency to value) (48). There are two likely reasons for this dis-
crepancy. First, bottom–up saliency was computed differently
here. Although van der Lans et al. (48) included three important
perceptual features (color, luminance, and edges), these were
measured only on a per-pixel basis after smoothing at a single
spatial scale. Such an algorithm massively underestimates the
effects of neighboring regions on the current region. Our saliency
map was generated by measuring many perceptual features (color,
luminance, edges, shapes, orientations, etc.) at many different
spatial scales (i.e., from single pixels up to groups of pixels) and
combining these measurements into a comprehensive saliency
map. Second, although top–down information was deﬁned here as
an endogenous personal preference, van der Lans et al. (48) used
an exogenous deﬁnition of top–down information by instructing
subjects to look for a speciﬁc item before each trial. This type of
top–down motivation may correspond well to certain types of
tasks (for example, when shopping from someone else’s shopping
list). However, our results here indicate that when using personal
preferences as a purchasing guide, the effect of top–down infor-
mation may be much stronger.
One other study has also looked at the effect of saliency and
value in economic decision making and, consistent with our results
here, concluded that both saliency information and value in-
formation are required to explain these choices (49). Importantly,
although the Navalpakkam et al. (49) study did not determine the
ratio between saliency information and value information or an-
alyze sequences of multiple ﬁxations, it did propose an alternative
model of how saliency and value are combined based on Bayesian
inference. Their model proposed that expected reward was de-
termined through a multiplicative combination of value (assigned
before each trial) and a Bayesian estimate of low-level features
such as orientation. Subjects then simply chose the location with
the highest expected reward. One very important difference be-
tween the model presented here and the Navalpakkam model is
that whereas we have assumed visual saliency implicitly affects the
ﬁnal choice process only through biasing ﬁxations, Navalpakkam
et al. assumed that visual saliency was explicitly combined with
value to calculate the expected reward. We discuss this distinction
further below. Although their model ﬁtted their data well, we
believe there are several advantages of the DDM-based model
proposed here over a Bayesian model. First, the Bayesian ap-
proach requires an estimate of stimulus reliability (cf. ref. 50),
which is often not available in naturalistic decision making when
behavior is not overtrained. Second, Bayesian models do not
account for the required decision-making time and thus are ill-
suited for modeling the gaze process’s temporal aspect. Finally,
a growing body of evidence suggests the ﬁring properties of
neurons that likely drive decisions in the LIP and the FEF are well
described by stochastic accumulator models (cf. refs. 10 and 24).
Although we cannot rule out that a Bayesian model would also
model these data well, we believe that stochastic accumulator
models provide a more comprehensive explanation of choices
that includes time and a neurally plausible implementation.
Importantly, we considered each ﬁxation as independent and
grouped all ﬁxations before ﬁtting the model. This approach was
necessary here because subjects made relatively few ﬁxations per
trial. However, numerous studies have shown that initial ﬁxations
may differ from later ﬁxations during visual search tasks (8, 51,
52) and free viewing (53). One difference between this task and
Fig. 4. Modeled vs. actual gaze. (A) Fixation durations as a function of value.
χ2 –goodness-of-ﬁt test: v only, P ¼ 0:57 ; s only, P ¼ 0:04 ; sþ v, P ¼ 0:67 ; and
s× v, P ¼ 0:71. (B) Fixation durations as a function of saliency. Gray bars in-
dicate actual ﬁxation durations. Model results are shown as colored lines
(mean ± SEM) and offset on the x axis to facilitate comparison. Error bars for
modeling results were computed across all 576 possible sv combinations and
parameter values. χ2 –goodness-of-ﬁt test: v only, P ¼ 0:85 ; s only, P ¼ 0:60 ;
sþ v, P ¼ 0:91 ; and s× v, P ¼ 0:53. (C) Two actual subject trajectories (white
and gray). Number “1” indicates theﬁrstﬁxation location after subjects looked
away from the ﬁxation cross. (D) Two computer-simulated gaze trajectories.
Locations were offset to allow easier viewing. Circles enclose the ﬁxation
locations and the diameter of the circle is proportional to the ﬁxation duration.
Fig. 5. (A and B) Choice probabilities as a function of (A) value and (B)
saliency rank. Gray bars and error bars indicate pðnÞ for our data. Model
results are shown as colored lines (mean ± SEM) and are offset on the x axis
to facilitate comparison. Error bars for modeling results were computed across
all 576 possible sv combinations and parameter values. (A) χ2 –goodness-of-ﬁt
test: v only, P ¼ 0:99 ; s only, P ¼ 0:37 ; sþ v, P ¼ 0:90 ; and s× v, P ¼ 0:75. (B)
χ2 –goodness-of-ﬁt test: v only, P ¼ 0:72 ; s only, P ¼ 0:96 ; sþ v, P ¼ 0:97 ; and
s× v, P ¼ 0:83.
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other similar tasks is that we used a grayscale mask to enforce a
speciﬁc viewing time (2 s). A consequence of this manipulation
was that the ﬁnal saccades before choice were often between
visually meaningless gray boxes. Thus, we eliminated the ﬁnal
ﬁxations from our analysis because they are likely to be guided by
memory and value and not by salient visual information. As
mentioned, this study was part of a larger data collection effort
and we hope to investigate these saccades in future work.
One intriguing hypothesis for future work comes from studies
showing that early ﬁxations are driven toward higher-saliency
locations whereas later ﬁxations are driven to more top–down
relevant locations (53, 54). Here, value is top–down, so one might
expect that the inﬂuence of value and saliency would change later
in the trial. Namely, one might expect that saliency contributes
most to the ﬁrst ﬁxation and falls off later in the trial, whereas
value contribution is lowest early but increases throughout the
trial. Unfortunately because subjects made relatively few ﬁxations
in this study, our dataset did not provide enough statistical power
to test this hypothesis. Future experiments with larger displays to
encourage more eye movements could be conducted to test
this hypothesis.
The DDM vs. Other Accumulator Models. Here we have made ex-
tensive use of the drift–diffusion model to predict not only ﬁx-
ations but also the valuation process. Although the DDM is a
very popular stochastic accumulator model, it is only one of many,
including the leaky competing accumulator (5), race (4), the linear
approach to threshold with ergodic rate (LATER) (55), the
Ornstein–Uhlenbeck model (11), the sequential probability ratio
test (SPRT) (56), and indeed, conceptually, even integrate-and-
ﬁre neural models (cf. ref. 57). Furthermore, this model does not
include additional features that have proved useful elsewhere,
such as inhibition (58) or gating (24).
Moreover, whereas the gaze model uses the classical threshold
crossing to trigger a decision, the choice model was applied in a
ﬁxed-duration paradigm where the subject is asked to make a
decision at a speciﬁc time. In this task, the decisions are relatively
easy to make and may occur before the 2-s viewing period is
complete. Practically, this experimental paradigm was chosen to
encourage eye movements and to ensure that a sufﬁcient number
of eye movements were made in each trial to allow our gaze
modeling effort. Providing a very large display with many items
would have been an equally effective experimental design, but
would have made the computational modeling intractably slow
due to the increased number of combinatoric trajectories. How-
ever, the ﬁxed-duration experimental design is still consistent with
the DDM framework, assuming that the decision, once made, can
be held in memory until the end of the trial.
Importantly, the DDM has a distinct advantage over other
models in that the time of ﬁrst passage has been solved for in
closed form, signiﬁcantly simplifying computations (42). More-
over, as shown by Bogacz et al., many of these other models
reduce to the DDM under certain parameter assumptions (46).
Thus, although accuracy may improve through use of other models
and/or features, the model presented here is faster to compute
and retains the same basic response features. This makes this
model useful for marketers who seek to understand how to de-
sign product packaging to gain the most attentional advantage
for their products.
The Markov Assumption and Inhibition of Return. We assume that
each ﬁxation is independent of past ﬁxations, namely, the Markov
property. However, many studies report that subjects are less likely
to look at locations already visited [inhibition of return (IOR)]
(59, 60), thus violating the Markov property. Notably, there is
some controversy over the IOR effect strength during search and
for different measures of IOR (latency, probability of returning
to the same location or region, etc.) (60). Although we did not
ﬁnd that subjects were more or less likely to look at items already
viewed, it is possible that other measures of IOR would reveal
this phenomenon. However, given the 2 × 2 granularity of our
search array and that subjects had ample time to search, it is
unlikely that a strong effect will emerge. As display sizes and
number of options increase, it is possible that IOR will become
signiﬁcant. In this case, the order of the Markov process could be
increased to account for some past history of viewing.
A Combined Model of Perceptual and Economic Decision Making.We
have investigated a unique two-part model that links a perceptual
decision process with a value-based (economic) decision process.
Although each process has been previously modeled with sto-
chastic accumulators, this study combines models of both pro-
cesses in a single model. To create this integrated model we have
made several assumptions.
First, we assume both processes are governed by the same
formalisms and can be modeled as stochastic accumulation pro-
cesses. Although there is some controversy about whether eco-
nomic and perceptual decisions have similar neurobiological
substrates (cf. ref. 61), both have been successfully, and sepa-
rately, modeled by stochastic accumulator models (10, 40, 62, 63).
Second, we assume that the perceptual decision process inte-
grates absolute evidence and the economic decision process inte-
grates relative evidence on the basis of a max-vs.-next operation.
We assumed this on the basis of prevailing trends in both liter-
atures (2). However, because this is an open question in each ﬁeld
separately, it is clearly an open question here as well. We can say
that our data support these prevailing trends.
Third, we assume that these processes run in parallel and that
the perceptual process is the limiting factor for the economic
process. It is widely accepted that during ﬁxation at least two
things need to occur: (i) high-quality sensory information needs
to be extracted from the (para)foveal region of the eye and (ii)
plans need to be made about where to move the eyes next. Given
that the visual system is divided into the ventral (“what”) and the
dorsal (“where”) pathways, it would seem reasonable that these
two tasks are completed in parallel because they are likely to
involve different neural substrates (cf. ref. 64). What is currently
unclear is which one of these two processes should be the limiting
factor. In other words, does the information extraction phase end
when the location of future ﬁxation has been determined? Or,
conversely, does the eye move when the information extraction
phase is complete? In our model we have assumed the former
because in this task there is no time pressure and therefore no
pressure to gather as much information as possible in a single
ﬁxation. It is certainly possible that under different conditions
this assumption may need to be reversed.
Fourth, although these processes are distinct, they have access
to the same value signals. There is an abundance of evidence to
support the claim that the perceptual process could be imple-
mented in visually responsive neurons of the FEF, the LIP, and/
or the SC (24, 28, 30, 65–67). Similarly, many recent studies have
indicated that the economic decision process takes place in various
regions of the frontal and parietal cortices (68–71), including the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (72–74), the ventro-medial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) (75, 76), and the amygdala (77). Connections
between putative perceptual decision-making areas (FEF, LIP,
and/or SC) and putative economic decision-making areas (OFC,
vmPFC, and/or amygdala) abound, creating the possibility that
value information is shared directly between these processes.
Moreover, many of these areas receive input from common
regions, creating the possibility of a common source for value
signals in both processes. Thus, we consider this assumption
reasonable.
Finally, we assume that the only link between these processes
is that the perceptual decision process limits the durations for
which the economic decision process is ampliﬁed, implying that
the perceptual decision process is independent of the economic
decision process, but not vice versa. However, it is possible that
these processes are more intricately linked (via the anatomical
connections discussed above) and that these processes could
interact on a more subtle level through modulation between
these regions. Such modulation could happen at timescales much
E3864 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1304429110 Towal et al.
shorter than the time required to move the eyes and so may be
especially apparent in quick decisions. For the timescale of
decisions modeled, however, our results show that we need not
assume such an interaction to effectively model both the ﬁxation
process and choices.
Model Predictions and Future Directions. Each of our assumptions
can also be seen as a hypothesis to be tested empirically. Although
testing each of these assumptions was outside the scope of this
paper, future work should investigate whether these assumptions
hold as display sizes or search difﬁculty are increased, for example
by including items with the same value.
Despite these assumptions, however, our model is able to pre-
dict ﬁxation patterns with accuracy similar to that of other models
as measured by χ2 (here, 116–141; the best from ref. 24, 106–157),
and as measured by nAUC (here, 0.89–0.93; ref. 78, 0.83; ref. 79,
0.88; ref. 80, 0.89; ref. 22, 0.90; and ref. 23, 0.95). Moreover,
our model can predict choices with better accuracy than previous
models that do not model ﬁxation patterns, measured by the P value
of the χ2 –goodness-of-ﬁt test (here, 0.75–0.90; ref. 8, 0.64).
As presented, this model represents a unique integrated model
of perceptual and economic decision making, which has appli-
cations not only for understanding the neural basis of decision
making, but also to ﬁelds such as marketing that have a vested
interest in the factors affecting decisions. This model provides
a viable alternative to collecting eye-tracking data. Our model
uses only the display itself and a measure of subjective value to
predict the ﬁxation patterns and durations and subsequently
choices. The saliency can be computed a priori and thus does not
require extensive experimentation. In addition, there are many
established methods for gathering subjective preferences that use
either surveys or data about the current market share of various
products. Thus, this model provides a framework in which mar-
keters could examine how certain displays affect choices without
the need to collect time- and data-intensive eye-tracking data.
Overall, our model makes three unique contributions. In the
realm of economic decision making, we extend the aDDM by
incorporating a model of the ﬁxation process. In the realm of
perceptual decision making, we extend current stochastic models
of saccades beyond the ﬁrst saccade to account for the entire
sequence of ﬁxations and ﬁxation durations during visual search
for a liked item. And, in the realm of visual decision making as a
whole, we present a unique model that combines perceptual and
economic decision making to account for choices using only the
stimulus as input.
Materials and Methods
Subjects. Subjects were 16 male and 3 female Caltech students aged from 18
to 30 (mean 21) y and of mixed racial and ethnic backgrounds. Six subjects
were eliminated during prescreening because they had never tasted more
than six items in this study. At the beginning of the session subjects were
instructed to look at the items displayed in each trial and choose the item they
most wanted to eat at the end of the experiment (see Trials for details).
Subjects were also told that at the end of the experiment, one random trial
would be chosen and they would need to eat the item they chose on that
trial. This instruction was to motivate subjects to make realistic choices on each
trial. Subjects completed ﬁve practice trials before the start of the session.
These practice trials used stimuli that were not used for data collection.
Measuring “Value”. At the beginning of the session, subjects viewed in-
dividual photographs of each item that they would be choosing among
during the session. There were 41 snack food items in total. After the initial
viewing, subjects rated howmuch they would like to eat each item on a Likert
scale from “1” (“would not like to eat at all”) to “5” (“would like to eat very
much”). If subjects had never tasted the item, they marked it as a “3” and
these items were excluded from the possible stimuli. Thus, valid liking rat-
ings were 1, 2, 4, and 5; however, to avoid confusion, these ratings were
recoded to 1, 2, 3, and 4 for the analysis and modeling. If subjects had never
tasted more than 6 items of the 41 items (14.6%), they were eliminated from
this study. The subject’s liking ratings were considered to be the subject’s
“value” of each item. Previous research has demonstrated that dollar will-
ingness-to-pay for similar foods is highly correlated with liking ratings
(74, 81, 82), as well as charities (75), and thus liking ratings are considered a
reasonable measure of intrinsic value.
Measuring Salience. The stimuli originated from 100 photographs of 28 snack
food items (e.g., chips and candy) arranged on a shelf in four rows and seven
columns in a random order. From each photograph, we created 18 different
stimuli by cropping out groups of 4 items in a 2 × 2 arrangement and ap-
plying a Gaussian smoothing function ðσ ¼ 20Þ to the cropped edges. An
example stimulus is shown in Fig. 1A. This procedure produced 1,800 pos-
sible stimuli. For each stimulus, the saliency map was computed across the
entire image, using an extended version of the Itti–Koch algorithm (78),
including proprietary channels developed by EyeQuant Attention Analytics
(www.eyequant.com) (Fig. 1B). Unlike standard saliency algorithms (e.g.,
those available at ilab.usc.edu/toolkit and saliencytoolbox.net), EyeQuant
software is optimized using machine learning techniques to deal with Web-
page images, which contain large regions of a solid background color similar
to the images used in our experiments. We then computed the “rank-sum
saliency” from this map by taking the sum of all pixels in the region corre-
sponding to each item and ranking the sums in ascending order (lowest rank
sum saliency = 1, highest rank sum saliency = 4).
Importantly, the saliency of a single item varied from display to display,
depending onwhat itemswere surrounding it. For example, when a relatively
bright item, such as Lays Classic potato chips, is surrounded by items of similar
brightness (e.g., other items with predominantly yellow packaging), the
saliency rank of the Lays Classic potato chips will likely be lower than when
that item is surrounded by relatively dark items such as chocolate. Thus, the
saliency rank of each itemwas computed independently for all possible displays
and each item had a range of saliency ranks (one per display).
Because we did not manipulate salience, we carefully investigated our
stimulus images to ensure that the range of saliencies was sufﬁciently large to
measure a meaningful effect and that the salience ranks indicated legitimate
changes in salience and not just variations on the order of one or two pixels.
We determined the total salience for each display and then calculated the
salience of each item as the percentage of this total possible salience. If the
salience range were small, then we would expect the range and SD of
percentage saliencies to be small as well. However, we found that the range
of percentage saliencies was from 13.5% to 40.6% (27.1% average) and the
SD was ±5.1%, indicating that item salience existed over a meaningful range.
Moreover, in a single display, the difference in percentage salience be-
tween pairs of items ranged from −14.8% to 13.7% (28.6% average range)
with a SD of ±4%, demonstrating that the item salience in a single display
typically represented substantial differences in salience. A one-way ANOVA
veriﬁed that there was a signiﬁcant difference between the percentage
salience associated with different ranks (P = 1.17 × 10−67, F = 145.57, one-
way ANOVA). Further analysis revealed that the mean difference was 2.3 ±
1.1% (±SD) of the total image salience. Thus, images provided a large range
of salience values providing a meaningful measure and the salience ranks
indicate a legitimate salience change between items.
Stimuli. From the measures of value and salience described above, for each
four-item stimulus we have ameasure of the values of each item in the image
(1, 2, 3, or 4 for each item) and the saliency of the items in the image (1, 2, 3, or
4). Stimuli were excluded from the ﬁnal stimulus set if there were items with
the same value in the stimulus or items that the subject had never tasted. This
exclusion produced 24 possible saliency permutations and 24 possible value
permutations, for a total of 576 possible saliency–value permutations in
the stimuli.
However, because the photographs from which the stimuli came did not
span all possible permutations of the items (we created 100 permutations of
the 41!ð41− 28Þ! ¼ 5:37× 1039 possible), there was a limit to the number of the 576
saliency–value combinations that we could produce for each subject. The
number of permutations ðNsvÞ for each individual subject ranged from 12 to
110 with a median of 47.
Within each subject we also ensured that there was no correlation be-
tween the saliency and the value of any option (minimum r2 = 0.21 with a
P value = 0.542, F-test). The value was constant across all trials within a
subject, but the saliency varied on the basis of the particular combination of
items in the display as explained above.
Familiarity. In our experiment, salience was deﬁned to account only for
bottom–up factors. A subject’s history with an item was not considered a
bottom–up feature because this is not exogenous to the item itself, but
rather endogenous to the subject. We did consider, however, that a subject’s
familiarity with an item might be a separate top–down factor that could bias
the subject’s gaze and choices. Because we are working with human subjects
Towal et al. PNAS | Published online September 9, 2013 | E3865
N
EU
RO
SC
IE
N
CE
EC
O
N
O
M
IC
SC
IE
N
CE
S
PN
A
S
PL
U
S
SE
E
CO
M
M
EN
TA
RY
that will inevitably have different experiences with these items, a perfect
control for familiarity was not possible. However, we endeavored to control
for familiarity in the following three ways.
First, we did not use items unfamiliar to subjects in the displays shown to
that subject. Second, we recruited only subjects that reported that they really
liked junk food to increase the chances of subjects being equally familiar with
all items. Third, in a subset of subjects we collected familiarity ratings as well
as value ratings. These were collected in the same way as value ratings;
namely, subjects had to rank each item individually from 1 (“Not at all fa-
miliar: I have never seen this item before”) to 5 [“Extremely familiar: I eat
this item regularly (at least once a month)”].
We found that a subject’s familiarity with an item (range from 2 to 5
because items of familiarity 1 were not used) was not correlated with either
the subject’s value for that item (mean r2 across subjects = 0.09) or the
subject’s probability of choosing that item (mean r2 across subjects = 0.11).
Under conditions of time pressure or very large displays, these relations may
change. However, for the purposes of this experiment, we do not consider
familiarity to play a large role in subjects’ choice behavior.
Trials. Each trial consisted of three phases. First, subjects ﬁxated on a gray
ﬁxation cross for 500 ms. To minimize the effect of the center bias (83, 84),
this ﬁxation cross was randomly displayed at the location of 1 of the 4 items
subsequently shown. Further, the grid of 4 items was located randomly at 1
of 18 locations on the screen. Second, the stimulus with 4 items appeared on
the screen and subjects were permitted to freely look around the stimulus
for 2 s. Preliminary data revealed that 2 s was ample time for subjects to
make this type of choice. In addition, previous research found that partic-
ipants typically make similar types of decisions in less than 2 s (6, 81, 85) and
even that subjects can make accurate choices among 16 food items in less
than 3 s (86). During this phase, eye movements were recorded at 1,000 Hz
with an EyeLink 1000 (SR Research). After the 2-s exposure time, the stimulus
was replaced with the grayscale mask shown in Fig. 1A. Third, subjects
looked at the gray region at the location of their chosen item and pressed
the spacebar. Choices were measured by computing which gray region con-
tained the subject’s gaze at the time of the spacebar press. This task was a part
of a larger data collection effort, not all of which is reported here. Tasks
were counterbalanced to avoid any cross-contamination from other tasks.
Each subject performed a number of trials set by the number of possible
permutations and the number of stimuli in the set that matched those
permutations. For each individual subject the number of trials ranged from 29
to 133 with a median of 95. Importantly, during these trials, all subjects were
presented with multiple items in each of the 16 salience–value combinations.
Parameter Fitting. We ﬁtted the parameters of the gaze model ðk,ks,θ,cÞ,
using a leave-one-subject-out cross-validation. In other words, the model is
ﬁtted on the basis of the data of 18 subjects, leaving 1 subject out, and then
the ﬁtted parameters are tested with the data from the left-out subject. This
is repeated 19 times, each time leaving out a different subject. The optimi-
zation was performed using Matlab’s interior-point algorithm (The Math-
works) with constraints to ensure that the threshold θ was greater than the
noise c, that k was greater than ks (where necessary), and that none of the
parameters fell below zero. The optimization was performed from 10 differ-
ent seed points to ensure the robustness of our parameter ﬁts.
The ﬁt was performed by minimizing the Pearson χ2 -statistic between the
observed transition times and the predicted transition times. All transitions
were considered independent, following the assumed Markov property. For
each possible transition ðj→iÞ, the Pearson χ2 -statistic was computed by
taking the difference of the frequency of observed ðOkÞ and predicted
transition times ðPkÞ falling within bins deﬁned by the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th,
and 90th percentiles after the methods of Van Zandt (87) and Ratcliff and
Tuerlinckx (88). Because the predicted transition times followed a continuous
probability distribution function (Eq. 8), they were converted to frequencies by
multiplying by the total number of observed transitions (n). The χ2 statistic was
summed across each of the 16 possible transitions ðj→iÞ and all possible sa-
liency and value combinations ðs, vÞ according to the following equation:
χ2 ¼
X
sv
X4
j¼1
X4
i¼1
X
b
ðOb −nPbÞ2
nPb
: [14]
We also computed two other metrics to assess our model ﬁts. The ﬁrst is
a version of the area-under-the-ROC curve statistic that is more intuitive than
the χ2 -statistic. For the ROC analysis, we considered each combination of
saliency and value separately. For a given combination, all transitions fj,iðtÞ
were calculated from the equations above. Then, for each possible transition
ðj→iÞ, we systematically lowered a threshold from the maximum of the tran-
sition time probability curve to zero in 100 steps and calculated the number
of subject ﬁxations that were coincident with the part of the probability
distribution above the threshold (hits) and the number that were not co-
incident with this portion (false positives). Fig. S5 illustrates this process. For
each transition pair we also counted the total number of transitions (num-
ber of positives) and the number of time bins in which no transition occurred
(number of negatives).
These four numbers were calculated for each of the 16 possible transitions
ðj→iÞ. The ROC for a given saliency and value combination was then calcu-
lated by summing the total number of hits and dividing it by the total
number of transitions (positives) to get the true positive rate and plotting
this against the false positive rate (calculated as the sum of false positives
divided by the total number of negatives). The AUC was then computed
from the graph. Fig. S5 shows an example of this procedure. Because of
intersubject variability, the model could not be expected to perform better
than the AUC obtained by using one subject to predict another. Thus, we
normalized the model AUC values by the average ideal AUC obtained by
using a single subject’s data to predict the remaining n − 1 subjects’ data,
which was 0.90 for this dataset. Normalized values are reported as nAUC.
The second metric was used to assess whether model ﬁts improved simply
due to the addition of more parameters (M is the number of free parameters
for each model). The metric chosen was the AIC, which is a penalized max-
imum-likelihood statistic. Like the χ2 statistic, the AIC was computed from
the frequency of observed ðOkÞ and predicted transition times ðPkÞ falling
within bins deﬁned by the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles. Eq.
15 shows how this statistic was computed:
AIC ¼ 2
X
sv
X4
j¼1
X4
i¼1
 
M−
X
b
Ob   lnðPbÞ
!
: [15]
To compare the χ2 - and AIC statistics across subjects with different numbers
of valid saliency and value combinations ðNsvÞ, we divided each statistic by
the number of valid combinations for each subject to get the average value
for the statistic per saliency–value combination such that nχ
2 1
Nsv
χ2 and
nAIC ¼ 1Nsv AIC. Model performance increases as the nAUC approaches 1 and
as nχ
2 and nAIC decrease.
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